Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: The Resistance in Gaza is on quest for tangible victory

  In an exclusive six-hour-long interview with Ibrahim al-Amin, Wafic Qanso, Hassan Ileik, and Maha Zureikat from Al-Akhbar, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah took the time to discuss issues ranging from Syria, the recent Gaza war, the 2006 war with Israel, domestic Lebanese issues, and his own personal habits.

Al-Akhbar is publishing the interview as a multi-part series over the next two days. In this particular section, the interview focused on the recent Israeli war on Gaza.

To what extent did the war on Gaza in 2014 surprise you, especially since Hezbollah was cautious in the early days [of the war], in terms of its position and media performance. Was there fear that the Resistance was being lured into a trap?

It is obvious that the Resistance is not looking for a symbolic victory to lift morale or for a face-saving way out, rather it is looking for a real achievement, namely, lifting the siege, even if it is costly.Were the Palestinian developments expected? No, but they were not surprising either. Things surprise you if they happen out of context. Clearly the Israelis, not the Resistance, pushed matters in this direction since the kidnapping of the three settlers. The behavior of the Israelis was not the behavior of someone searching for kidnapped people. Under the pretext of looking for the three kidnapped settlers, they did all they could in the West Bank to wipe out Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front and everything that has to do with the structure of the Resistance. Things escalated and I am closer to the view that developments took a life of their own, and the Israelis went along and the Resistance went along, in the sense that neither of them planned for the war. Some, unfortunately, accused the Resistance of going to war to revive its political role or to resuscitate the Turkish-Qatari-Muslim Brotherhood axis. I don’t see it that way.

The Israelis, who are observing the developments and transformations in the region, are not in a rush to go to war. But when events started happening, an opportunity and a threat presented themselves. The Israelis wanted to take advantage of the opportunity and the Resistance confronted this threat and tried to turn it into an opportunity. That is how we understand what happened. The Israeli side thought, since we went to war anyway, we might as well take advantage of this opportunity. Especially as Gaza is under siege, the Arab world is torn apart, the focus on regional and international affairs is elsewhere and the concerns of the Arab people are also elsewhere. In the early days of the war, Israel hit all the targets they knew of. However, rockets continued to be launched from Gaza. That is why Israel found itself facing a big problem. As for the Resistance, it was determined to use this war that was imposed on it as an opportunity to lift the siege. It is obvious that the Resistance is not looking for a symbolic victory to lift morale or for a face-saving way out, rather it is looking for a real achievement, namely, lifting the siege, even if it is costly.

This is a point of strength for the Resistance, first, because it is the wish of all the Resistance factions in Gaza and secondly, because there is a real popular will on the issue of lifting the siege. Perhaps people disagree with Hamas on issues like running the Gaza Strip, power and government, and the factions may disagree in their positions regarding regional events but the question of lifting the siege is a unanimous, popular demand for all Gazans.

This is our understanding of the nature of the battle. That is why when a cease-fire and a truce were suggested at the beginning, there was a consensus among the Resistance factions not to accept the offer without lifting the siege. From the beginning of the war, that was the goal of the Resistance. The Israelis, in my opinion, were stuck and they tried really hard to learn from the mistakes of the July War (2006 war on Lebanon.) From the beginning of the war on Gaza, Lebanon’s July War was present in the Israeli media.

Do you agree that the goals of the enemy were modest?

That is one of the lessons of the July War. The Israelis tried to learn from the lessons of the July War, but instead, they got stuck. That is why they did not specify a goal. I followed the war from the beginning, it is not clear to me what the goal was. There is no final official word on that. One speaks about toppling the Hamas regime, another speaks about disarming the Resistance or stopping the rockets or stopping the smuggling or manufacturing of rockets or destroying the tunnels. Even the question of the two prisoners, they are ignoring it as much as possible because they know they can not get them back without negotiations and without a price. They will not get to them through political or military pressure. The Israelis are in a predicament. Perhaps they thought the Resistance does not have the will to persevere and the people will not be able to withstand this level of sacrifice. I believe the enemy thought, as Shimon Peres did in the 1996 Grapes of Wrath operation, the Resistance’s stockpile of rockets will run out. Then they will say that they stopped the rockets without giving anything to the Palestinians. But their calculations did not pan out.

Did you receive a request from the Palestinians for direct intervention?

Brother Mousa (Abu Marzouk) talked about it. But no one from the other factions talked to us and I think they understand.

Does [Abu Marzouk’s] request reflect Hamas’ real position?

Had this request been serious, it would have been discussed within closed circles, not in the media. The lines of communication between us and Hamas were never severed, even during the period when it was said that our relationship regressed. The lines of communication exist and there are always contacts. He or one of Hamas’ leaders could have asked us to discuss the issue. But to bring it up in the media, in my opinion, raises questions and I did not find it appropriate. I don’t want to analyze, what matters are good intentions and understanding. Perhaps he believed the situation was difficult so he brought up the idea, but an issue of this importance and gravity should not be discussed through the media. That is why we did not follow up on the request in the media, because this issue – whether there is an interest to interfere directly or not – ought to be discussed between us.

Have you talked to Hamas about this issue?

No.

You did not discuss the matter?

The Israelis are in a predicament. Perhaps they thought the Resistance does not have the will to persevere and the people will not be able to withstand this level of sacrifice.We are always in contact but we did not talk about this issue and neither did they.

In your opinion, how long did the Gaza war delay the next Israeli war on Lebanon?

I can say that it delayed it but I can’t say for how long. Because it is unclear under which circumstances and conditions the Israelis would wage a war if they wanted to. After the July War and the lessons they learned, the Israelis assume that any future war must lead to a quick, decisive and clear victory. In the July War, everyone said Israel was defeated but some might claim otherwise. This happened recently when some said they discovered that they won because the South Lebanon front was not opened, even though this front was not opened during the intifada after 2000, or during Operation Defensive Shield in 2008 or the eight-day war in 2012.

Since the July War, Israel insists that victory in any war in Lebanon must, first of all, be quick. It cannot take a long time and cannot turn into a war of attrition and bombing of cities. Second, a victory should be decisive, not limited or temporary and the war should achieve all the goals, not modest goals. Third, it has to be clear and unambiguous. The reason for this is their realization that any future war is going to be a lot more difficult in terms of its targets and the ability of the Resistance – its rocket capabilities and capabilities in all areas. The enemy cannot withstand a war of attrition. We see Israel today under pressure even though the number of rockets launched from Gaza on Tel Aviv and other areas is quite limited. They speak of the effectiveness of the Iron Dome but that is debatable because the Iron Dome might be able to intercept a limited number of rockets but it will face a real issue when there is a large number of rockets.

Israel worked hard to learn the lessons of the July War in terms of its training and equipment and tried to implement what it learned in Gaza. It assumed that it addressed all the gaps, not to mention that it has massive intelligence on Gaza. Nevertheless, they failed and they are the ones saying this, not us. So when they fail in their confrontation with Gaza, which is besieged and its capabilities are known, then surely they must seriously reconsider their calculations. I believe things are different after the Gaza war than they were before it.

What is your advice to the Palestinian Resistance and people in Gaza?

These are their convictions, their will and their culture. When a human being is given two choices, either surrender or fight, there is no choice between fighting and humiliation. The culture of the Resistance and the choice of the Resistance grew among the Palestinian people because they have no other option. They tried [with] the negotiations and they waited long enough for the regional and international situations to change. In relation to Egypt, a golden opportunity presented itself for Gaza and the whole Palestinian cause but it was soon lost. For the people living in Gaza, what choices do they have? Either resist or surrender to Israeli conditions or throw themselves in the sea or immigrate and join the refugee camps. I think after all these experiences, the Palestinians have no choice but the one they have chosen today. There is no choice here, in the sense that if a human being cares about his dignity, survival and existence, he resorts to this choice. There are people who surrender. The people of Gaza made up their minds not to surrender and to withstand the consequences of this decision, even if it was costly. They have confidence in the Resistance and that the path of the Resistance might yield results. Reason and logic – not slogans – say that they should fight.

Clearly there is a problem between the Resistance axis and the Egyptian leadership. The issue is not just about Hamas. How do you deal with the position of the Sisi government regarding the assault on Gaza and the pressure on the Resistance?

I want to borrow the words of one of the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance that Gaza’s problem is that it is caught between a problem of confidence with Israel on one hand – a fundamental and substantial problem – and between two axes on the other, the Qatari-Turkish axis and the Egyptian-Saudi-Emirati axis. The reasons for this division are understandable and well-known, but unfortunately it is a sharp and jarring division at a time when this division should be overcome one way or another. We, for example, after consultations with the brothers in the Palestinian factions and the brothers in Iran, suggested to the Iranians to get in touch with the Turks, Qataris, Egyptians and Saudis even if it is through the United Arab Emirates or Oman. As far as the Resistance axis is concerned, we are not concerned with scoring points or using the Resistance movement in internal and regional considerations. There is a fundamental goal, and that is stopping the war on Gaza and lifting the siege. When there are clashes, the priority is for people to talk to each other. But in the midst of the events, the Egyptian position, for example, was difficult as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan attacked Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi personally. Even the Qatari position towards Egypt, through Al-Jazeera, was negative. If you want to help Gaza, then you should talk to Egypt. The Palestinians themselves say that any solution or compromise is not possible without Egypt. This requires the two competing axes to give priority to Gaza over all the other discussions and conflicts, which has still not happened in an appropriate manner.
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How do you see your relationship with Hamas in the future, not just as a political party, but also in terms of Iran and Syria, especially after the Gaza war?

They speak of the effectiveness of the Iron Dome but that is debatable because the Iron Dome might be able to intercept a limited number of rockets but it will face a real issue when there is a large number of rockets.Even before the Gaza war, we disagreed on Syria but contacts and meetings were never put on hold. Everything stayed normal.

And the support?

Obviously, our entire situation was affected by the events in Syria, Iraq and the region. On the Syrian issue, in all the meetings we had, the concern was always to understand their position and for them to understand our position even if we disagreed on assessing what is happening. We had many discussions around this issue. Of course the Gaza situation redirects the path to its priorities so we can communicate and cooperate more. That will push the relationship between Hezbollah and Hamas and between Hamas and the Islamic Republic [Iran]. The Syrian question is different, complicated and requires more time. It is subject to regional developments and has no prospects in the foreseeable future.

Are we going to enter Jerusalem?

I have no doubt.

The public today wonders what we have to do with Palestine and why should we liberate Jerusalem?

The most dangerous problem we face today, whether it is with the Lebanese or Arab public, is to get to a point where the people of the region consider Israel’s existence normal. That it does not constitute a threat to the region and the people of the region and that, if it is a problem, it is so for the Palestinian people only and not for the rest of the people in the region. This has to do with politics, security and economics. First of all, Israel is an illegitimate entity and it is a threat to the region. It is a constant threat to the whole region. We cannot coexist with this threat, that is why the ultimate goal of the [Arab and Islamic] nation is to end Israel’s existence irrespective of the problems, sensitivities and everything that has happened and could happen between Palestinians and non-Palestinians, Shia and Sunni, Muslims and Christians. All the strife, sensitivities, disputes and struggles should not eradicate the culture that says Israel is a cancer, an absolute evil and a danger to the peoples and governments of this region and to their dignity and holy sites. Therefore, the ultimate goal should be to remove it.

[The Israelis] want to get us to the point [where we fight each other and forget about Israel]. There are times when they succeed but we should never get there. This is if we are talking politics, economics, security, military, environment and so on. If we are talking from an ideological standpoint, then this issue should not be subject to debate. When it comes to ideological issues, the popular space that is affected by moods and emotions contracts is narrower. People confirm that they have an ideological position on Israel and it does not change if we are on good terms with the Palestinians or not.

Therefore, Hezbollah’s relationship to the conflict with Israel, even in terms of the realities on the ground inside Palestine, is not up for debate.

Al-Akhbar is publishing the interview as a multi-part series over the next two days. In this particular section, the interview focused on his personal habits and tastes.

Do you like football?

If you step into my heart you will not find that I like one area, one neighborhood, or one village more than others.Yes I like football and I used to play it with friends, before and after I put on the turban.

Do you support a particular team?

In the past, I used to for fun and as a change of pace. I mostly supported Brazil, but sometimes Argentina, especially when Maradona used to be with them. I liked the way he played.

And in the recent World Cup?

It was rumored that I was supporting Brazil, but I was not rooting for anyone. Among Hezbollah’s supporters in general, there is support for Brazil. It’s an old preference based on their nice techniques and game. Then, people started saying that the Brazilian flag is green and yellow, which are the two significant colors for Shia.

Did you follow it?
Frankly, this year the current atmosphere did not allow me to follow such issues, due to the events in Lebanon and Syria and what is happening in Gaza and Iraq.

Did you watch any of the games?

I saw a part of the final game, but for my son’s sake and not for the game itself. Since he supported Germany, I decided to create some suspense and stood by Argentina’s side.

Do you use Facebook?

Due to the security situation, I should stay away anything related to mobile phones or the internet. Thus, I don’t have a direct relationship with Facebook. However, I am always up to date on all sorts of discussions, rumors, and conversations happening on Facebook, through reports and summaries on the issue.

Usually, people get used to a place, a bed, or pillow and would not be able to sleep if they change them. How do you adapt to the constant changes in your life?

This is true. But when changing places and relocating become a part of a person’s life, it becomes the usual situation. Such things have become natural to me, especially after 2006. Before that, what you said used to be accurate.

What is your favourite dish?

I used to have preferred dishes in the past. But today, there is nothing in particular. I eat what’s available. Even if I am asked what would I like to eat, I say I don’t have a problem with anything. This has been the situation recently. I eat what is easily ready, like the soldiers on the front, who do not have a choice of preferred foods. In the past, I used to like several dishes like moloukhieh, moujaddara with rice, and fish.

Has it been long since you drove a car?

Yes, at least since 1986.

Dahiyeh changed after 2006. Do you have an idea how it has changed?

Of course, since I am not away from Dahiyeh and I know its details. The Israelis promote a certain idea, assisted by Arab media, which says that I live in a bunker, sheltered from people. [Apparently] I don’t see or talk to anyone and I’m even secluded from my brothers. But I do not live in a bunker. Security measures mean secrecy of movement. However, this does not totally prevent me from moving around and looking and seeing what is happening. The problem is when others see me. I know what Dahiyeh and its people look like and whatever progress or deterioration there is, in addition to the situation in the South and the Bekaa in particular.

What part of Lebanon do you like?

The type of life I lived puts emotions on an equal distance from the issues at hand. I lived in Bekaa when my personality was forming. For years, if I said I wanted to rest – before 2000 and for some time after that – or if I wanted to go spend the evening with friends, I would go to Baalbeck. I made personal friends in that period. Practically speaking, with time one’s feelings about certain areas or even towards people you love and who love you will no longer be partial. One cannot say they like an area more than another area or a group more than another group. You start feeling that you love everyone and support everyone. You want everyone to be with you. If you step into my heart you will not find that I like one area, one neighborhood, or one village more than others.

Do you watch movies or TV series?

When I have time, I follow some series such as al-Taghriba al-Filastiniya, al-Nabi Yusuf, al-Hajjaj Bin Yusuf, al-Ghaliboun, and similar shows.

Do you read novels?

There are those who support us and those who do not. It is not enough to read [the articles of] those who support you. I read a lot of novels in the past. But it has been five years since I read anything of the sort. A short while ago, I received a book, as a gift, called Ain al-Jawza, so I read it. When you are in a position of responsibility, this all stops and the priority would be to read current affairs. In terms of culture, for example, I read articles dealing with the question of takfir, its history, causes, and direction. There are several excellent books on the issue, by Shia and Sunnis, since this subject is a real trial. In the period before 2006, my reading focused on Israel, such as biographies by its generals, politicians, and party leaders. This is our battle and we are now specialists on the subject.

Do you read Al-Akhbar?

Of course. Could we not read it? I used to get it with other newspapers. But recently, certain changes occurred, so I read it though the briefing prepared by the consultative office, which contains most of its articles, in addition to summaries.

Do you follow television channels other than al-Manar?

I flip through television channels constantly. Actually I do not agree on the theory that says that television channels’ popularity have certain limits, as shown by opinion polls. I think such polls are not precise. I do not see a television channel with a closed audience. I think what happens with me, happens with other people. When we sit across from television, we carry the remote control and flip through the channels. If one sees an interview with someone saying something useful, one would stop at the channel, regardless of its name. As for the news, I follow a series of channels and do not rely on only one. I follow three of the Arab satellite channels, Al-Mayadeen, Al-Jazeera, and Al-Arabiya. But I certainly watch Al-Mayadeen more than the others. However, I check what’s on Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, because I want to know what they are saying, regardless of my opinion, especially in terms of the news. As for Lebanese channels, I flip through all of them. This has to do with wanting to know what they are saying. I also review the media briefs prepared by the Media Relations [department] regarding radio stations, television channels, and internet sites. Reading this material helps you form a general idea.

Are there particular writers you follow?

Without going into names, there are several writers whose articles I make sure I read.

Do they support you politically?

Not at all. There are those who support us and those who do not. It is not enough to read [the articles of] those who support you. You should read from both sides to get to know different points of view.

Do you speak languages other than Arabic and Farsi?

I used to speak English. But due to lack of practice, I can understand but rarely speak it. I listen to the news and understand what they say. When I used to meet foreign ambassadors or media, I used to understand the questions and the discussion. However, I am completely fluent in Farsi, although my relationship with that language was mainly political at the beginning. With time, however, I discovered that there is a part of Islamic culture that Arabs are deprived of, because it is in Farsi.

Does Hezbollah feel responsible for Shia Arabs (Twelver Shias, Ismailis, Alawis, etc.)?

It was clear to Arab governments and all political forces that Hezbollah was among the serious forces, if not the most serious force, that have taken it upon themselves to confront the Zionist project.

There is always someone trying to promote this characterization of us. Hezbollah was established nationally and regionally as a resistance [movement] against Israel, and achieved in this battle great accomplishments and major victories. It was clear to Arab governments and all political forces that Hezbollah was among the serious forces, if not the most serious force, that have taken it upon themselves to confront the Zionist project. Consequently, there can be no questioning of the connection Hezbollah has to the conflict with Israel, and the realities on the ground in Palestine. For this reason, as [dramatic] developments came to the region, there were attempts to exploit [divisions] in every arena. In Egypt, because there is no Sunni/Shia [split], the schism was painted as opposition vs. the regime. The same thing happened in Libya and Tunisia. But in Iraq, they opted for sectarian incitement, and the countries and media outlets that took Iraq to that kind of incitement, during and after the US occupation, are well known. When the incidents erupted in Syria, they also turned the conflict into a sectarian one through agitation, incitement, and [inflammatory] rhetoric, mobilizing fighters from all over the world.

For Hezbollah, when it offers any help or support in any one arena, its calculations are not sectarian, but are rather based on what we call the nation’s battle, the nation’s project, and the interests of our countries and peoples. For example, when the Americans occupied Iraq, part of the Iraqi popular mood was not on the side of the Resistance because of Saddam Hussein’s oppression of the Iraqi people, and because of successive wars and the embargo. This is normal because the people were exhausted. But, and this is no longer a secret, who was it that devoted its political discourse, and all its media capabilities, relations, and contacts, from day one, all the way to [forging] a relationship on the field with the Iraqi Resistance, especially in Shia circles? Hezbollah did not go to work in line with the Shia mood, but rather to work on this mood, and through any margin available for resisting the US occupation of Iraq.

Resistance took off in Iraq, and a large part of it was, to put in quotes, a Shia resistance, in the sense that the factions engaged in resistance were affiliated to Shia Iraqis. A large number of the operations were documented by video, but the Arab satellite channels, like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya and others, refused to carry them. Isn’t that odd? Why did that happen? Because they did not – and this is not an accusation against Sunnis but against some regimes – want to acknowledge the existence of a Shia resistance with ties to the Iraqi Resistance.

From the outset, they opted for sectarian agitation in the Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese issues. They insist that the Resistance in Lebanon is Shia. We tell them this is a national Lebanese resistance [movement] for all Lebanese. It just happened that Shia live on the borders with the enemy entity, which is why they are the ones fighting, yet they insist we are a Shia and Iranian resistance, and so on. Those who want to continue using this characterization let them do whatever they want. But for us, we were keen from the beginning on stressing that our presence in Syria was not on a sectarian basis, and that we had helped resistance in Iraq on non-sectarian grounds as well. We have helped Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Palestinian factions, which happen to be Sunni. It has always attempted to cover up our contribution in Palestine to project upon us a sectarian motive. We say: Where we can defend Palestine, the Resistance Axis, and the people, where we can be present and where we can help, then we will do so. If Hezbollah has the will to defend its people and the cause of its nation, and is willing to do so, then this is not a crime or a sin. The question should be directed to the others: Why do you not shoulder your responsibilities and why do you not defend?

If Hezbollah had not fought in Qusayr and in Qalamoun, the last battle would not have been confined to Ersal alone. The Bekaa would have been “finished,” and they [the extremists] would have reached Mount Lebanon, Akkar, and the coast, and the battle would have been in Beirut and the South. This much is certain. Offering martyrs to save all these lives, dignity, and properties is a logical, religious, moral, patriotic, and humanitarian duty.

If Hezbollah had not fought in Qusayr and in Qalamoun, the last battle would not have been confined to Ersal alone.

You said that Hezbollah is a phenomenon rather than a party, and therefore it represents all Shia, especially in the current climate. But those who (in times of peace) may be with the Resistance, may be against Hezbollah in matters of development, or municipal and parliamentary affairs, which has prompted accusations against Hezbollah of imposing itself on the Shia.

I cannot accept this characterization. But at any rate, this is normal. Hezbollah is made of humans. There is an arena of sacrifices where it operates, where you may find all people are on its side, such as the arena of resistance. But in other arenas, this clarity may not be present for all people like it would be in the arena of resistance. People who operate in these other arenas may commit mistakes. The difference is that in certain areas, mistakes might appear, while in others, those engaged in action might make mistakes that people cannot see. In all cases, it is difficult for a group of humans, call it a party or a movement, to operate in all domains and please all people, or capture all their ambitions, hopes, and expectations.

Hezbollah has many advantages, at the level of ethics, seriousness, commitment, and faithfulness, but they are also human, who have certain capabilities and capacities. This is while bearing in mind that we, in many areas, are keen on diversifying [partners] and do not handle responsibilities alone, including in municipal affairs. There are many mayors for whose work, even when positive, Hezbollah cannot take responsibility. Sometimes, positive things could be the result of personal efforts rather than an agenda. On the issue of municipalities, there are norms and traditions that even Hezbollah could not bypass, including the subject of family representation. Municipal councils, even those affiliated to Hezbollah, cannot claim to be Hezbollah institutions. For this reason, in this regard, people need constant development. In addition, the conduct of individuals and officials, which varies from one place to another and between one person and another, their convictions and their moods, all these things play a role. What remains is the issue of resistance. I am with the notion that there is no problem even if people make a distinction, though I don’t mean making a full separation. A person might tell you: On the issue of resistance, I support Hezbollah, but on the municipal issue, I do not, or in trade unions, or on a stance on a particular piece of legislation. This is normal. At one time, I said: separate resistance as resistance and a just cause, from the attitude vis-à-vis Hezbollah or the dispute with Hezbollah that can start from supporting a certain mukhtar or student body in a university to the president of the republic. We can disagree on other issues, but [the question should be] how can we work without the dispute with people or political forces being reflected on the issue of resistance?

There is a feeling among people that despite offering many martyrs, no one appreciates it, which raises questions about its worthwhileness?

Even in Iraq, there were those who asked, like in Lebanon, what has brought Hezbollah to Syria? Some would debate us regarding the motive and causes. After what happened in Iraq, they have accepted our vision. Today, whether in Iraq or even in Syria, the popular mood is of concern to us, and the popular mood has begun to change. I am receiving a lot of gratitude.

From people or from politicians?

Hezbollah has many advantages, at the level of ethics, seriousness, commitment, and faithfulness, but they are also human, who have certain capabilities and capacities.

It has nothing to do with politicians. People in our environment are aware of this battle, and in other environments, this awareness is growing and so is the sense of danger. I have received very important messages. There are people who have reservations about talking in the media. As for the politicians, be confident that whatever we give them, they will never be satisfied nor will they acknowledge it. Unfortunately, there is a group of politicians who now have an automatic hostility [to us], unrelated to whether what we are doing is right or not. In some stages, international and regional actors had instructed groups affiliated to them to antagonize us, but their enmity has reached such an extent that even the actors who were behind them are telling them the priorities have now changed. There is no solution that works with these [groups].

Can Syria help in earnest with an issue like the refugee issue, by allowing them to return?

The problem is, do the displaced want to return? We are all willing to help them. Some can return and live in safety and security. There are entire areas, in Damascus, Homs, Qalamoun, and elsewhere, where the militants fought the state for three years and then entered into the settlements, and today no one is harassing them. These were fighting, so how [can it be worse] for those who only fled? So let us look for the real reasons why some insist on taking refuge in Lebanon specifically. This requires a serious will among those refugees first, and a decision by the political forces second, to stop using the refugees against the regime, humanitarianly, morally, militarily, and politically. These [forces] are encouraging the militants to bring their families to Lebanon so that they can fight [more freely] there. Incidentally, I confirm that Lebanese support for militant groups in some Syrian regions continues, in terms of funding, arming, intervention, care, and guidance, though away from the spotlight. This is continuing and has not changed. What is required is a political decision to stop using the refugees, and subsequently, initiate cooperation with the Syrian government to return them to their country. What I know is that Syria is very willing to cooperate in this regard.

Does your participation in the war in Syria exhaust Hezbollah in terms of both men and material, and to what extent can Hezbollah bear this risk?

To say that it exhausts [Hezbollah] is an exaggeration. But in any case, the sacrifices Hezbollah has made in Syria, from the start of its intervention to the present day, remains much less than the sacrifices and costs Hezbollah and all the Lebanese would have had to pay later if had not intervened.

Has the fighting in Syria revealed tactics that Hezbollah wanted to keep as a surprise for the Israelis?

What has been prepared for Israel differs naturally from the battle we are fighting against the armed groups. I do not see that anything Hezbollah had prepared or hidden for the battle with Israel has been exposed. On the contrary, and this is one of the positive upshots – but not the reason to go to Syria naturally – this battle has imparted on us further experience, knowledge, and broader horizons that can be put to use in a better way in any future confrontation with the enemy, both in attack and defense. Israel is watching Hezbollah’s experience in Syria. A lot has been said in Israeli discussions, that Hezbollah, after the experience of Qusayr and Qalamoun, can implement lessons from those two experiences in a battle in the Galilee. The battle in Syria gives us an edge in any battle with the Israeli enemy, and nothing has been lost from our hands that would have been beneficial in the battle with the enemy.

Have you clashed with the Israelis inside Syria?

Directly, no.

So where is this opposition in the political and the field equation today? It has no value or influence.

Does Hezbollah’s presence in Syria help the people of the Golan Heights launch a popular resistance movement?

This depends on their will. When you talk about resistance in any given area, if the people of that area, the locals living in that land, have a will to resist, you can be an element of help as had happened in Lebanon. In 1982, the Iranians and Syrians did not come to fight in Lebanon. There were Lebanese people who had the will to fight to liberate their land, so helping them was meaningful.

Both before and after the IED attack in Shebaa, there have been multiple attacks in the Golan. Is Hezbollah linked to those attacks?

 

What I know is that there is a real formation present there, a popular formation that expresses a certain will. They are the ones at work, not us.

Is it true that you met with Syrian dissidents recently, and that some have since changed their stances?

There is no need for those I met to change their positions. But I can say they understood our position.

Do you make distinctions among the elements that make up the Syrian opposition?

Practically, in the current reality, the external opposition no longer has any presence inside Syria. It did not have any presence to begin with, in my opinion, and had no influence in the Syrian interior. They are a group of political, cultural, or intellectual figures who were brought together in the framework of a certain political project. The majority of them live on the doors of embassies, hotels, and remain at the doors of embassies and hotels. This is not just my opinion, but their own opinion. Major symbols in the so-called national opposition coalition say this in meetings with their Lebanese friends. They say that they just talk and meet and issue statements, and that they had only grown more divided by the embassies and [foreign] powers, and the so-called Friends of Syria group. This is the reality of the opposition abroad. So where is this opposition in the political and the field equation today? It has no value or influence. The field is run by the armed groups. Even the Free [Syrian] Army was not an army, but a group of separate armed groups that sometimes coordinate with one another and many times fight with one another over spoils, checkpoints, and border crossings. Practically now, a large part of the battlefield is with ISIS, and a smaller part with al-Nusra Front, and another part with what has been recently called the Islamic Front. As for national, secular, or civil groups, they do not exist anymore. I don’t want to quote [US President Barack] Obama on this, but he is an expert on them. The American ambassador ran a large part of the opposition. Now, the opposition on the ground is made up of mostly extremist armed groups that fight one another. This has been the ultimate outcome of the situation. Even if we want to find certain political forces in the opposition to engage them in dialogue or for a settlement, we will not find any.

 

M. A.